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HISTORICAL REVIEW
Tropical cities such as Singapore do not have well-de-
ﬁ  ned inﬂ  uenza seasons but have not been spared from in-
ﬂ  uenza pandemics. The 1918 epidemic in Singapore, which 
was then already a major global trading hub, occurred in 2 
waves, June–July, and October–November, and resulted in 
>2,870 deaths. The excess mortality rate was higher than 
that for industrialized nations in the Northern Hemisphere 
but lower than that for less industrialized countries in Asia 
and Africa. The 1957 epidemic occurred in May and re-
sulted in widespread illness. The 1968 epidemic occurred 
in August and lasted a few weeks, again with widespread 
illness. Tropical cities may be affected early in a pandemic 
and have higher mortality rates. With the increase in travel 
and trade, a future pandemic may reach a globally connect-
ed city early and spread worldwide. Preparedness and sur-
veillance plans must be developed to include the megacities 
of the tropical world.
I
nﬂ  uenza has had a substantial effect worldwide. The 3 in-
ﬂ  uenza pandemics of the 20th century (1918–9, Spanish 
Flu; 1957–8, Asian Flu; and 1968, Hong Kong Flu) resulted 
in 40 million, 2 million, and 1 million deaths, respectively 
(1,2). Their social, cultural, and economic effect has been 
best described in North America and Western Europe (3).
Although tropical countries such as Singapore do not 
have as well-deﬁ  ned inﬂ  uenza seasons as temperate re-
gions, they are not spared from the effects of inﬂ  uenza (4). 
Each year, 20% of Singapore’s population is estimated to 
be clinically infected from seasonal inﬂ  uenza (5). Deaths 
caused by inﬂ  uenza in Singapore over the past decade were 
≈14.8 per 100,000 person-years, which is comparable to 
deaths caused by this disease in the temperate United States 
and subtropical Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion, People’s Republic of China (6). However, the effect 
of pandemic inﬂ  uenza in tropical cities has not been well 
described. This study aims to describe the effect of these 
pandemics on Singapore, a global trading city throughout 
the 20th century. The lessons learned from the effect and 
management of previous pandemics may have implications 
for pandemic planning in tropical global trading cities.
Methods
To determine the effect of inﬂ  uenza on mortality rates 
during the pandemic years, we obtained monthly mortality 
rate data from various ofﬁ  cial sources in Singapore. For 
the years surrounding the 1918 pandemic, data were ob-
tained from the Annual Departmental Reports of the Straits 
Settlements (the British colonies that included Singapore, 
Penang, Malacca, and Labuan; the last 3 are now part of 
Malaysia), and from the Registry of Births and Deaths, 
Singapore. For the years surrounding the 1957 and 1968 
pandemics, data were obtained from the Registry of Births 
and Deaths, Singapore. These were the only ofﬁ  cial gov-
ernment departments responsible in the respective years for 
the collection and veriﬁ  cation of these statistics.
Because tropical countries do not have well-deﬁ  ned 
inﬂ   uenza seasons, methods for the analysis of excess 
deaths in temperate countries such as that used by Serﬂ  ing 
et al. (7) may not be appropriate because the assumption 
of inﬂ  uenza seasons in distinct, regular waves may not be 
valid. We have thus elected to use direct statistical analysis 
of data for the 2 years before and after the pandemic year 
to form a regression line with 95% conﬁ  dence intervals. 
Deaths for each month were then compared with the regres-
sion line. Months for which the mortality rate exceeded the 
95% conﬁ  dence intervals were considered as those with ex-
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cess deaths, with the excess represented as the actual mor-
tality rate minus the predicted mortality rate.
To provide another perspective of possible excess 
deaths for comparison, we used another method described 
by Murray et al. for 1918, with a simpler equation to es-
timate excess deaths (8). For 1918, death rates during the 
3-year pandemic window were compared with those in 
surrounding years, i.e., the average mortality rate for the 3 
years before and after were subtracted from the mortality 
rate during the 3-year pandemic window.
In addition to statistical analyses, we conducted a 
detailed search of peer-reviewed journal articles, gov-
ernment reports, and press articles for the 3 pandemics. 
Search results provided comparisons of the mortality rates 
in other countries and an overview of the public health 
issues and interventions conducted in Singapore and how 
they compared with those of other countries and current 
recommendations.
Results
The 1918 Pandemic in Singapore
The 1918 Straits Settlements Annual Report described 
an inﬂ  uenza epidemic in June and July that was relatively 
mild, with a high illness rate but a low mortality rate, that 
peaked during the week ending July 6 (9). A second in-
tense wave occurred in October and November, leading to 
frequent pneumonia and a high mortality rate. It peaked 
during the week ending October 26, with 97.6 deaths per 
million population (10).
The 1918 Annual Report indicated 844 recorded inﬂ  u-
enza deaths. However, the Straits Settlements’ overall an-
nual mortality rate was “43.85 per thousand in 1918 when 
the inﬂ  uenza epidemic struck the country” (10). This is in 
contrast to the immediate prepandemic and postpandemic 
years from 1915 to 1921, when mortality rates ranged from 
29/1,000 to 37/1,000 population. The excess mortality 
rate within the Straits Settlements in 1918 was therefore 
11.3/1,000 (9,435/827,719).
Figure 1 shows that the excess mortality rate of the 
epidemic in Singapore alone, as calculated by our method, 
was 7.76 per 1,000 (2,870/369,800) during May–June and 
October–November 1918. Using the formula of Murray et 
al. (8), we calculated the excess mortality rate for Singa-
pore during the pandemic years of 1918–20 to be 1.80% 
(18/1,000, or 6,656 deaths).
The excess mortality rate for Singapore during the 
1918 pandemic years was higher than rates for most indus-
trialized countries such as the United States and those for 
western Europe (Table), but lower than rates for African 
and Asian countries such Kenya, South Africa, India, and 
the Philippines. The excess mortality rate of 1.80% for Sin-
gapore was higher than the global average rate of 1.06% 
and higher than the rate for other Asian countries such as 
Taiwan (1.44%) (8).
To reduce the effect of the pandemic, the government 
used available evidence to institute a series of preventive 
measures. The government and physicians advised infected 
persons to isolate themselves and seek treatment, to dis-
infect the ﬂ  oors of public premises daily, and, during the 
second wave of the outbreak, to avoid crowded places (16). 
Suggestions were also made to restrict or prohibit visit-
ing of hospitalized patients, and schools were closed for a 
week at the peak of the second wave (16). Recommended 
prophylactic measures included reducing the amount of fa-
tigue and maximizing ventilation.
By the end of November 1918, the epidemic was over 
in Singapore, although the media still reported the dis-
ease in Indonesia, New Zealand, South Africa, Japan, and 
other regions. There were no local reports or evidence of 
a third wave similar to that in temperate countries in early 
1919 (17).
The 1957 Pandemic in Singapore
The media declared the 1957 pandemic as the “worst 
ever in colony [Singapore] history” (18). The outbreak 
was ﬁ  rst recognized at the end of April and early May and 
was purported to have spread through Hong Kong from its 
origins in northern Asia (19). By May 5, the outbreak had 
become an epidemic, reaching its peak in mid-May and ta-
pering off by the end of the month (20). In May, 77,211 
(47.6%) of 162,093 patients who came to government and 
city council clinics were treated for inﬂ  uenza; 326 required 
hospital admission, and 28 deaths from inﬂ  uenza were re-
corded (22 from pneumonia and 6 from cardiac complica-
tions) (20). On the basis of monthly mortality rate reports 
(Figure 2), an excess mortality rate of 0.47/1,000 occurred 
in May 1957. This represented 680 deaths in a population of 
1,445,900. There was another small peak of excess deaths 
in October 1958, although this was only slightly above the 
baseline value.
Figure 1. All-cause monthly mortality rates, Singapore, 1917–1919. HISTORICAL REVIEW
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During the 1957 epidemic, the government focused 
on public health measures, including closure of schools for 
almost 2 weeks because of illness and absenteeism. The 
public was advised to keep away from crowded places (20), 
and the slogan “no movement of persons – no spread of in-
ﬂ  uenza” was professed (21). At healthcare facilities, elec-
tive surgery was minimized to release staff to manage the 
epidemic. School health clinics, maternal and child health 
clinics, and voluntary clinics were set up as inﬂ  uenza treat-
ment centers (20). Although no port quarantine measures 
were required by law, the airport health ofﬁ  cer checked 
outward-bound passengers for airlines upon request. Simi-
larly, 1 shipping line screened all passengers boarding their 
ships, and those who failed screening were denied embar-
kation (20).
The 1968 Pandemic in Singapore
The 1968 pandemic was the mildest of the 3 pandem-
ics; the epidemic in Singapore occurred in early August 
and lasted for a few weeks. The virus was believed to have 
spread from a major outbreak in Hong Kong (22).
The outbreak in Singapore peaked August 16–25. At-
tendance at outpatient dispensaries increased over a 2-week 
period, and at the peak daily attendance increased 65% 
from 6,052 to 9,966 (23). On the basis of monthly mortality 
rates (Figure 3), the excess mortality rate was 0.27/1,000 
(543/2,012,000) during August and September 1968. Ex-
cess deaths peaked again in May and June 1970, which 
mirrored a possible second pandemic wave, as reported 
worldwide in 1969–70, although the lower second wave ex-
cess mortality rate was similar to rates in the Americas and 
different from rates in Europe and Asia (24). The excess 
mortality rate for 1970 was 0.15/1,000 (309/2,074,500).
The 1968 epidemic caused substantial illness and ab-
senteeism from work. However, because of the relatively 
mild and short epidemic, no substantial measures were ad-
opted. The Ministries of Education and Health considered 
the closure of schools but decided against it because of the 
waning of the epidemic (25).
Discussion
Excess mortality rates vary according to the method 
used for calculation and sources of data, facts that reiter-
ate the difﬁ  culty of conducting historical estimates. Never-
theless, the estimated number of inﬂ  uenza deaths (2,870–
6,656) in Singapore in 1918 exceeded the ofﬁ  cial report 
of 844 inﬂ  uenza deaths. The 1918 Annual Report admit-
ted that the latter number poorly represented actual deaths, 
which it estimated more accurately at 3,500 (9). The 1921 
Annual Report added that many deaths reported as pneu-
monia were due primarily to inﬂ  uenza (10). This showed 
that tropical Singapore had mortality rates comparable to 
or exceeding those of temperate regions (Table). Similarly, 
the calculated excess deaths of 680 in 1957 exceeded the 28 
recorded inﬂ  uenza deaths.
The excess mortality rate for Singapore (Table) sup-
ports the hypothesis that income levels and development 
were negatively correlated with inﬂ  uenza mortality rates 
(8,26) because Singapore was less industrialized than 
many industrialized Western cities and nations in the early 
20th century. However, Singapore, as a main trading city, 
was relatively more industrialized with a proportionately 
smaller rural population, and thus had lower mortality rates 
than did neighboring countries such as India and the Philip-
pines (Table). Even in Singapore, attack rates were lower 
for Europeans and Asians with higher socioeconomic sta-
Table. Estimated deaths and mortality rates due to influenza during the 1918–1920 influenza pandemic 
Country  No. deaths (in 1,000s)  Mortality rate (per 1,000), %  References
United States  402–675 3.9–6.5 (8,11–13)
Canada 50.0–51.0 6.1–6.3 (8,12)
Denmark 6.02–12.4 2.0–4.1 (8,12)
England 116–200 3.4–5.8 (8,12)
Spain 257–311 12.3–14.9 (8,12)
Portugal 59.0–159 9.8–26.4 (8,12)
India 185 6.1–43.9 (8,12)
Japan 368–517 6.7–9.4 (8,12)
Ceylon (Sri Lanka)  51.0–91.6 10.0–17.9 (8,12,14)
Taiwan 25.4–52.8 6.9–14.4 (8,12)
The Philippines  81.0–288 8.0–28.4 (8,12)
Argentina 10.2–46.0 1.2–5.4 (8,12)
Australia 14.5–15.4 2.7–2.9 (8,12)
Kenya 104–150 40–57.8 (8)
South Africa  300 44.3 (8)
British Honduras (Belize)  1.01–2.00 2.3–4.6 (15)
Trinidad and Tobago  0.30–1.00 0.1–0.2 (15)
Singapore 2.87–6.66 7.8–18.0 This report Inﬂ  uenza Pandemics in Singapore
  Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 13, No. 7, July 2007  1055 
tus (6.0%–20.4%) than for persons with a lower socioeco-
nomic status (29.0%–29.8%), which suggested that socio-
economic status had a possible role in disease transmission 
(19,27). Another possible explanation is that those who 
were more educated were also more receptive to public 
health messages, which reduced disease transmission.
Using the formula of Murray et al. for the 1918–20 
pandemic, we determined that the excess mortality rate 
for Singapore was higher than the global average rate. Be-
cause the Singapore epidemic occurred early in the global 
pandemic, this ﬁ   nding corroborates the suggestion that 
early epidemic centers experienced higher mortality rates 
(8). This is also evident when one compares the mortality 
rates for tropical countries such as Ceylon (present day Sri 
Lanka) and Singapore with rates for tropical Caribbean is-
lands (Table). During the second wave of the pandemic in 
Spain in October 1918, Asian nations such as Ceylon and 
Singapore also reported similar epidemic recrudescence in 
early October (28). By the end of the second wave of the 
pandemic in Singapore, there were still reports of inﬂ  uenza 
in Malaysia, Indonesia, New Zealand, and Japan (9,29). 
This ﬁ  nding also suggests that nations are at high risk of 
acquiring early infection and could act as sentinels for the 
next pandemic.
The effect of all 3 pandemics was felt across Singapore. 
However, reported overall mortality rates of 43.85/1,000 in 
1918 were comparable to “46.46 per thousand in 1911, a 
very malarious year” (10). Deaths during the ﬁ  rst epidemic 
wave were initially attributed to malaria (30). The 1918 
pandemic also had a variable effect in US possessions in 
tropical regions (3). The early effect from the 1918 Sin-
gapore epidemic may not have been noticeable because 
of the nonseasonal nature of inﬂ  uenza in the tropics (4) or 
because of the high background mortality rates from in-
fectious diseases and other causes in Singapore. Although 
excess deaths in 1918 were substantially higher than excess 
deaths in 1957, the relative change in mortality rates was 
similar; peak monthly mortality rates were twice baseline 
mortality rates for both periods (Figures 1, 2). The 1918 
baseline mortality rate was 4× higher than the 1957 rate, 
and the decrease in the baseline mortality rate was largely 
due to improved socioeconomic conditions and control of 
infectious diseases such as malaria. With the low baseline 
mortality rate for modern cities, the effect of a pandemic, 
however mild, may be noticed (the Singapore media de-
clared the 1957 pandemic as the worst). Although studies 
suggest that pandemic mortality rates will be higher for in-
dustrialized countries (8,26), if a pandemic were to ﬁ  rst ap-
pear in less industrialized regions with high baseline mor-
tality rates, the pandemic might be missed or dismissed as 
yet another spike of endemic infectious diseases during the 
initial epidemic phase until deaths increased.
Apart from illness and death, subpopulations were also 
severely affected by the pandemics. In 1957, the closure of 
670 schools affected 262,000 students who required alter-
native care and education. Commercial ﬁ  rms reported staff 
absenteeism of 10%–30% (31). Clinics were frequently 
overwhelmed, and available healthcare workers were re-
called to cope with the increase in inﬂ  uenza patients. How-
ever, healthcare workers were at high risk for infection 
(14,31). In 1918, 12 (63%) of 19 nurses at the Singapore 
General Hospital were concurrently ill (32); in 1957, 25% 
of the nursing staff in Taiping (a Malaysian town) were ill 
(33). Healthcare workers were stressed as they coped with 
personal illness and increased numbers of patients.
Although more is now known about inﬂ  uenza pathol-
ogy and epidemiology, in 1918, inﬂ  uenza was correctly 
reported as being highly infectious and spread by breath-
ing, coughing, and spitting, and having an incubation pe-
riod “from a few hours to three days” (34). Even with the 
knowledge gap, measures such as respiratory hygiene, so-
cial distancing, and disinfection were promoted (16,19). In 
the recent World Health Organization recommendations 
for pandemic inﬂ  uenza, respiratory hygiene has been en-
couraged as a routine preventive measure (35). Social dis-
tancing and disinfection may also be considered to reduce 
its effect, depending on severity and transmission of dis-
ease, to reduce its effect, although deﬁ  nitive evidence is 
Figure 2. All-cause monthly mortality rates, Singapore, 1956–1958. 
Figure 3. All-cause monthly mortality rates, Singapore, 1967–1970. HISTORICAL REVIEW
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lacking (35). The effect of school closures remains unclear. 
Ferguson et al. suggested that closure of schools does not 
substantially reduce overall attack rates but does reduce 
peak attack rates (36). Germann et al. suggested that school 
closures may be effective if conducted early in pandemics 
with low reproductive numbers (low Ro values) (37). How-
ever, interventions such as travel restrictions and border 
controls have been shown to be not feasible (36). Although 
some of these measures may reduce illness and death, they 
have to be weighed against productivity losses and socio-
economic effects of the interventions.
With the increase in travel and trade, a future pandem-
ic may reach a globally connected city before preparedness 
plans can be fully activated. The 1918 pandemic is thought 
to have originated early in the year and had spread to Singa-
pore by June. Another globally connected city, New York 
City, also showed an early wave in February–April 1918 
(38). The 1957 and 1968 epidemics arrived weeks after 
their suspected origins in northern Asia because of travel 
from Hong Kong, another globally connected city (21,23). 
These type of cities are also the focal point of spread, as 
shown by the spread of inﬂ  uenza from Singapore to India 
in 1957 (39). 
Mortality rates suggest that the 1918 epidemic in Sin-
gapore may have occurred in May, which is earlier than in 
ofﬁ  cial reports (Figure 1). This ﬁ  nding suggests the possi-
bility of late recognition. Delayed recognition must be con-
sidered even in this modern age. In 2003, the severe acute 
respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic reached Singapore 
within weeks of its appearance in the southern part of the 
People’s Republic of China but remained undetected. Two 
of the 20th-century inﬂ  uenza pandemics and the SARS epi-
demic are believed to have originated from farms in eastern 
Asia. SARS was ﬁ  rst detected in Foshan, quickly spread to 
Guangzhou City (a major regional trading hub), to Hong 
Kong, and then to the rest of the world. A global surveil-
lance effort is therefore critical to enable prompt activation 
of pandemic plans. This effort should include frontline sur-
veillance of farms in eastern Asia and secondary surveil-
lance of major Asian cities.
Trading hubs may be affected early in the course of 
a pandemic and show higher mortality rates. The megaci-
ties of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are now extensively 
involved in global trade and travel networks and are more 
likely to be affected by a pandemic. However, inﬂ  uenza is 
a difﬁ  cult surveillance target, with an accuracy of clinical 
diagnosis in 1968 of only ≈66% (40). A good laboratory 
surveillance network in major cities is therefore critical to 
enable accurate diagnosis and virus identiﬁ  cation.
This study has some limitations. Mortality rate data in 
Singapore, although of good quality because of the small 
size of the country, were available only from limited sourc-
es. We have attempted to use estimates from other govern-
ment agencies such as the health department and ministry 
of health. Weekly data would have provided better infor-
mation, but quality data were available in the press only for 
certain weeks, which we have presented.
Globally connected cities will be especially vulnerable 
to a future pandemic, and preparedness plans must be de-
veloped to include the megacities of the tropical world. The 
20th-century pandemics swept through Singapore within 4 
weeks; future plans must include such a possibility over 
a similarly short duration. Public health measures such as 
surveillance and preparedness plans must be formulated to 
slow the spread of a pandemic and mitigate its effects.
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